3 edition of effects of institutional investors on takeover activity found in the catalog.
effects of institutional investors on takeover activity
by Investor Responsibility Research Center, Corporate Governance Service in Washington, D.C. (1319 F. St., N.W., Suite 900, Washington 20004)
Written in English
|Contributions||Investor Responsibility Research Center. Corporate Governance Service.|
|LC Classifications||HG4910 .P68 1985|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||21 p. :|
|Number of Pages||21|
|LC Control Number||86112779|
their impact on institutional investors be reexamined. See infra note 46 and accompany-ing text. In light of the SEC's apparent willingness to relax at least some regulations that burden institutional investors, the overregulation thesis again loses some of its con-temporary force. 8. In this context, our aim is to address the role of pension funds as institutional investors in financial development, and trace the effects of such financial development on economic performance. We shall note inter alia some of the ways in which the behaviour and impact of institutional investors might differ in emerging market economies from.
Institutional investors and especially pension funds are expected to grow rapidly in many industrialized countries that are going to rely more on private funded schemes. One possible spillover effect will be the participation of pension funds in corporate governance issues. The role of institutional investors in corporate governance has been. institutional changes from the s to the s served to either transfer wealth from bidders to targets or truncate the distribution of takeover gains. Target firm, acquiring firm, and combined gains in the s are well in line with similar gains in the s. Instead, our results conform more closely with a view discussed by.
By watching the trading activity of corporate insiders and large institutional investors, it's easier to get a sense of a stock's prospects. While insider or institutional ownership on its own is. We find that the effect of foreign institutional ownership in cross-border M&A activity is more pronounced in countries with weaker legal institutions, with lower shareholder protection, and in less developed markets. These findings suggest some substitutability between country-level governance and foreign institutional investors.
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The effects of institutional investors on takeover activity: a quantitative analysis. Purchase Takeover Activity, Valuation Estimates and Merger Gains - 1st Edition. Print Book & E-Book. ISBNTakeovers: Their Causes and Consequences 25 Table 1 Intensity of industry takeover activity as measured by the value of merger and acquisition transactions in the period –84 (as a percent of total takeover transactions for which valuation data are publicly reported) compared to industry.
This paper examines whether one of the most important participants in the effects of institutional investors on takeover activity book market, the institutional investors of target companies, suffers from the disposition effect and, if so, how this selling bias influences the takeover outcomes.
I report robust evidence that target institutional investors are reluctant to realize by: 8. The Real Effects of Financial Markets Second, we employ an instrumental variable that directly affects the market price, but that affects takeover probability only via its effect on the market price.
Conceptually, this is a difﬁcult problem: any variable that is directly. When firms with large public pension fund presence do acquire other firms, they perform relatively better in the long-run. Other institutional investors have either the opposite effect or no effect.
Table 11 Panel A reports findings about the effect of institutional investor type on key characteristics related to firm performance and risk as well as corporate governance. We find that firms held by dedicated institutions have lower realized volatility and lower.
While shareholder activism by institutional investors has gained increased prominence over the last few years, there has been limited empirical work investigating the effects of this activism. 1 The empirical work that has studied the issue has tended to concentrate on the activities of a particular institutional investor – Smith (), Huson () and Nesbitt () focus on the California Public.
institutional investors in the UK takeover market from to SinceUK firms have the flexibility to conduct a placing, which is comparable to the commitment offering of US firms. Lower profitability and dividends, poor investment allocation and low productivity may be the result of failure to address these “corporate governance” problems.
Institutional investors, because of their greater bargaining power over the firm relative to individuals, are well placed to minimise these problems. The growing dominance of equity holdings by institutional investors, both domestic and international, is casting a sharp focus on their activities and owners and monitors of firms.
Finally, there are interesting effects of the control variables. First, high book equity/ market equity ﬁrms cut total long-term investment more. Second, ﬁrms that were takeover targets or rumored to be takeover targets cut long-term investment more. These results suggest that inefﬁcient ﬁrms cut long-term investment more when an.
Effects of takeover protection on earnings overstatements: Evidence from restating firms Article in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 33(4) November with 27 Reads. Summary and conclusions The increasing share of stock market holdings in the hands of institutional 98 A.D.
Cosh et al., Institutional investment, mergers and corporate control investors does not seem to have altered the basic underlying characteristics of the takeover selection process in the U.K.
CSR can improve firm value in the long run through two channels. First, CSR can reduce a firm's risks, such as lawsuits due to a lack of product safety or sanctions resulting from socially irresponsible activities (Shane and Spicer,Waddock and Graves,Agle et al.,Heal, ).
Institutional investors are seen as key investors on the financial market, crucial market makers, supporting market liquidity and activity, as well as important pillars of pension systems and for. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior.
Accounting Review, – Google Scholar; Bushee B. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value. Contemporary Accounting Research, – Google Scholar; BusinessWeek.
Now, a big job at Kodak means you'll buy. “ The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments on Takeover Activity: Some Direct Evidence.” Journal of Law and Economics, 30 (10 ), – Pound, J.
“ Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight.”. institutional investors make shareholder activism ineffective, then there would be no expected improvement in operating performance and no associated increase in shareholder wealth.
The initial stock price reaction could still be positive if investors incorrectly perceive benefits from activism, but the initial reaction would be corrected over time. The Effect of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development: Bronwyn H.
Hall (p. 69 - ) (bibliographic info) (Working Paper version) 4. Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers: Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W.
Vishny (p. - ) (bibliographic info) (Working Paper version) 5. Because the pattern of low investment in R&D is longstanding, and because the firms taken over have less rather than more R&D capital than the industry as a whole, it seems unlikely that the recent increase in takeover activity has had a significantly negative effect on R&D spending in these industries.Finally, it is important to note that our results are robust to controls for the change in foreign institutional investors (FIIs) surrounding the passage of takeover laws because institutional investors are associated with an active monitoring role and can facilitate cross-border M&A activity (See, e.g., Harford et al.
; Ferreira and Matos.Some researchers contend that substantial holdings by institutional investors and corporate governance are significantly correlated while others argue the absence of such a relationship. Evidences are also inconclusive on whether institutional investors invest in good governed companies or their holdings improve the governance practices.